

July 24, 1973

1 DEPARTMENT OF THE INTERIOR

2 NATIONAL PETROLEUM COUNCIL

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P R O C E E D I N G S

CHAIRMAN TRUE: The meeting of the National Petroleum Council will please come to order. I would like to extend a welcome to our new members. It is a pleasure to have you at our first meeting of the new fiscal year.

Because of an unforeseen commitment, our distinguished Co-Chairman, Mr. Morton, is unable to be with us today, however, we are very pleased that Governor John Love has consented on short notice to be with us. I know that he has a pressuring schedule and for this reason we will depart from our agenda and allow him to speak prior to the roll call and introduction of new members.

It is now my pleasure to introduce a man with whom I am sure you are all familiar. He is new in Washington, but has served with distinction as Governor of Colorado for ten years.

When President Nixon issued his recent Energy Message, he tapped the Governor to head the new Energy Policy Office at the White House. As the Director of this office, we welcome his leadership in this very important area.

It gives me great pleasure to present to you Governor John Love, Director of the Energy Policy Office.

REMARKS OF GOVERNOR LOVE

GOVERNOR LOVE: Thank you very much and good morning. When I did receive a call, I was very pleased to come over and read you perhaps a few remarks about my new office.

1 I think perhaps the first question, and perhaps a little
2 biased, is "What is a nice guy like me doing in a place like
3 this"?

4 The bias is the indication that I am a nice guy.

5 But to get back to how this need did occur, I remember
6 saying on several occasions, we badly need a national energy
7 policy. Someone may have overheard me and I find myself in a
8 position where this has been indicated. As Assistant to the
9 President, I am heading the Office of Energy Policy.

10 The office is designed to establish policy, be the
11 primary advisor to the President on energy policy, and to
12 giving coordination and direction to the various agencies which
13 have responsibility to the field of energy.

14 As you well imagine, I am up to my ears in reports. I
15 find there is no lack of publications on the energy problem
16 or the energy crisis, and I feel a little bit like I landed
17 right.

18 Let me say I do look forward to working with all of you.
19 In my viewpoint there is no quick, easy answer, panacea. We
20 are going to live with the very, very tight situation for the
21 foreseeable future. The long range can be looked at perhaps
22 more optimistically, as you know, than the short range.

23 It is the kind of problem that is going to have to be
24 fought on all fronts and on all sides. I believe, basically,
25 and I don't believe I overstate it, the importance of energy

1 to this nation, and to our world, our society as we know it,
2 makes the forthcoming decisions in the areas in which we seek
3 to find additional energy -- not only petroleum but the whole
4 range -- uranium, coal, hopefully fusion and maybe solar and
5 so on -- the whole problem is broad enough in its problems
6 side and also on the reliance our whole affluent society
7 places the need for energy so that it is going to be one of
8 the great dialogues and debates, at least for the next decade.

9 I am a little concerned at the present time that we do
10 make sure that proper information, knowledge, is conveyed to
11 the public. At least a portion of the FPC troubles me, not on
12 the basis of a charge or they are accused of any wrong doing,
13 but whatever the facts in that situation are, they tend to
14 get in the way of the full information the public needs and
15 is entitled to to make the decision we are going to have to
16 make. And not to throw it off on some sort of plot.

17 The problem is as much a consumer and demand problem as
18 it is a supply problem. We are going to have, at least for
19 the short term, to develop truly a conservation ethic. We are
20 no longer going to be able to control and waste energy.

21 Beyond that, the decision of whether we indeed can, with
22 the greatest of effort, build the technology, do the innova-
23 tions and inventions and so forth that will allow a doubling
24 again of our energy demand every 12 or 15 years, is still a
25 decision I don't think has been made.

1 But let me say, all of the problems, the interface
2 energy, the environment, the whole problem of America's posi-
3 tion in the world, secure to balance of payments and so on,
4 are nevertheless, as a matter of instinct and commitment, come
5 down on the side of the fact that indeed man is and has been
6 endlessly innovative, inventive, to get out the job. We can
7 provide, and will provide, the energy that is necessary with
8 the continuation of the kind of society we intend to build
9 and continue to support in the United States of America.

10 I will need all of the help and support you can bring
11 and I look forward to working with you. Thank you very much.

12 CHAIRMAN TRUE: Thank you, Governor, for your remarks.
13 I know that your schedule is very tight, and we sincerely
14 appreciate the fact that you made a special effort to be with
15 us.

16 I am grateful that we have had the good fortune to also
17 secure another great speaker - a man whom I am personally
18 very proud of because he is from my State of Wyoming, a great
19 gentleman, a true statesman and a close personal friend, and
20 a man who is admired by all of you because he speaks
21 eloquently on the energy issues which face us today, a member
22 of the Senate Interior Committee, it gives me great pleasure
23 to present Senator Clifford P. Hansen.

24 REMARKS OF SENATOR CLIFFORD P. HANSEN

25 SENATOR HANSEN: With the ever increasing proposals being
offered by self-styled experts to end the energy crisis --

1 or punish those responsible for it --, it is a pleasure and
2 distinct honor to be here this morning with a distinguished
3 group, the "Real McCoys" as far as the energy crisis is con-
4 cerned.

5 You are the realists.

6 You and your associates have discovered the oil. You
7 know about the multitude of activities and investigations
8 that take place prior to drilling. You know about borrowing
9 money, the difficulty in persuading others not regularly in
10 the oil business to invest their dollars in your ventures.
11 You understand the motivation behind the doers in our economic
12 life; the role the profit motive plays in choosing investments--
13 and where to make them -- North Dakota, North Africa, the
14 North Slope or the North Sea. You've also learned that the
15 Arctic deep freeze may extend thru several summers. Likewise
16 the realities of life help determine for most Americans as to
17 whether to be an oil man, a manufacturer, a farmer, or if your
18 frustrations with government is exceedingly high, a politician.
19 Recent developments, I am told, would indicate that the last
20 mentioned profession is losing some of its glamor. Don't
21 assume I'm dismayed as a practicing politician. I've always
22 felt there was too much competition anyway.

23 The other group of energy experts, albeit self-styled --
24 have a head start on you.

25 They are not inhibited or restrained by the facts.

1 They have the support of environmentalists:

2 -- Those who believe we're using too much energy -- and
3 insofar as waste goes, I admit we are.

4 -- Those who believe our total energy sources are finite
5 and may last, at best, not more than from one to a few hundred
6 years.

7 -- Those who believe that we can and should change our
8 ways and our life styles so as to use practically no energy.

9 -- Those who believe that despite all other considerations,
10 the immediate improvement of the environment warrants and
11 justifies the immediate implementation of all proposed environ-
12 mental constraints and prohibitions, and others we may not yet
13 have thought of.

14 This group is not concerned about:

15 -- National security;

16 -- Industrial capability and output;

17 -- Economic stability and balance of payments;

18 -- Our standard of living;

19 -- Jobs for Americans;

20 -- America's role in world affairs -- which includes
21 foreign policy.

22 The self-styled energy experts have another distinct
23 head start on you -- while there are exceptions, generally
24 they have the media with them.

25 Read any paper, watch and listen to any TV commentator,

recall what you heard on your car radio:

- The energy crisis is contrived.
- Oil men have had years of unfair tax advantages.
- All oil men are millionaires.
- Oil men dictate federal government policy.
- Oil men are polluters.
- Oil men are responsible for the energy crisis because they knew it was coming and didn't do anything about it.

One more observation must be made about our friends, the self-styled energy experts.

Many of them are politicians.

Sometimes, it is more important to fix blame on someone else than it is to work for real solutions.

Other times the seeming advantage of proposing immediate action is compelling.

Examples:

-- Crash programs of research and development directed by newly created federal agencies and financed with billions of federal dollars.

-- Divestiture of operations if they include more than one of the following operations: production, transportation, refining, and marketing.

-- Public utility regulation of the industry.

-- Nationalization of the industry.

Politicians have one other advantage on you. In case of

1 trouble, they'll fix responsibility.

2 Some pretty important members of the President's cabinet,
3 not too many years ago, were saying close down all of the
4 stripper wells, buy most of our petroleum abroad, save the
5 American consumer at least five billion dollars annually.
6 That was before they learned that others besides our Israeli
7 friends in the Middle East could read English. And that,
8 like the law of gravity, the law of supply and demand works
9 in North Africa, too.

10 These are just some of the forces and background manipu-
11 lating the curtains, lighting and props as the energy crisis
12 moves on stage.

13 Political expediency is always important.

14 Phase IV which will soon become effective needs your close
15 attention.

16 Should we hold prices down, thus demonstrating our earnest-
17 ness in fighting inflation or, agreeing with Secretary Butz
18 that "you don't get more by paying less" let petroleum, whether
19 it be crude or refined product, rise in price.

20 Should we deregulate natural gas?

21 Should we weigh the wisdom of bonus bidding on O.C.S.
22 leases in the context of the industry's need for capital?

23 This administration faces decisions that may outlive
24 Watergate.

25 The wrong energy move now could make present-day shortages

1 pale in comparison to those ahead of us.

2 Phase IV as proposed with respect to oil and gas goes
3 180 degrees in the wrong direction.

4 As you comment, keep in mind: politicians are going to
5 demagogue this issue for all it's worth. Only when most
6 Americans understand the facts, will things be changed.

7 And you will certainly have the opportunity during the
8 next few months of countering the charges that have been and
9 will be made. When Senator Moss withdrew his divestiture
10 amendment to the Alaska pipeline bill, Senator Jackson said
11 there would be hearings, probably joint hearings by the
12 Interior, Commerce and Antitrust and Monopoly Subcommittee of
13 the Judiciary Committee. And Senator Jackson has already
14 announced his investigation by the Government Operations Sub-
15 committee.

16 So there will undoubtedly be a bloodbath in the coming
17 hearings and you can be sure that these hearings will have
18 preference over any administration proposals, including de-
19 control of FPC regulation of natural gas production.

20 At least the industry has been forewarned and can be
21 lining up its best troops to counterattack. Some of the treat-
22 ment top-level industry witnesses have had in hearings this
23 year should be a warning of what to expect, and I would hope
24 such witnesses would speak up loud and clearly.

25 The industry has been a convenient whipping boy for the

1 candidate making his appeal to the Nader crowd and the environ-
2 mental extremists. And you can be sure when the TV cameras
3 are on, the candidates will be doing their thing. It will be
4 no time or place for a timid witness or those of faint heart.
5 And there is no occasion for intimidation. You have a plausible
6 story to tell and certainly nothing to hide.

7 CHAIRMAN TRUE: Thank you, Cliff, for being with us today.
8 Assistant Secretary for Minerals and Energy, Stephen Wakefield,
9 has offered to pinch hit for Secretary Morton and it gives me
10 great pleasure to present him to you at this time.

11 REMARKS BY STEPHEN A. WAKEFIELD

12 MR. WAKEFIELD: Secretary Morton regrets very much that
13 he cannot be here today and has asked me to express his regrets
14 and to extend best wishes to you.

15 Since our last meeting, there have been a series of
16 significant events for the American people and the petroleum
17 industry which serves them.

18 While the American consumer may still face seasonal fuel
19 shortages during the next two or three years, the possibility
20 of a gasoline shortage this summer is becoming increasingly
21 less likely. There is little question that motorists have
22 responded to our conservation pleas. The rate of increase in
23 gasoline usage this year from last year was six and a half
24 percent in the first quarter. It was only 5.3 percent in the
25 second quarter, when we were beginning our effort to have the
public save fuel. The petroleum industry deserves a large

1 measure of the credit for easing a potentially hazardous
2 situation, and I want specifically to recognize that achieve-
3 ment. Although demand reached a record seven million barrels
4 per day in June, refiners supplied that demand and actually
5 improved the inventory position in gasoline. To do this, they
6 ran their plants virtually flat out. Operations have ranged
7 above 90 percent of capacity since the last week in May, and
8 have exceeded 95 percent or 99 percent by the new APC defini-
9 tion, of capacity since the first week in June. This is a
10 fantastic performance.

11 While we appear to be beyond danger of a large-scale
12 gasoline shortage this summer, consumer driving habits are
13 still going to determine the margin of balance between supply
14 and demand. Even with high refinery outputs we still face
15 the necessity to hold increases in our gasoline demand to
16 about four percent annually. Although none of these actions
17 guarantee an optimistic situation, they do indicate that if
18 government, industry, and the consumer continue to work
19 together, we can go through the next two or three years with
20 only minimal adverse effects.

21 I realize that this means operating plants at levels
22 that many thought impossible. For others, it means delaying
23 needed preventive maintenance and accepting higher operating
24 costs in the long run.

25 Unfortunately, few individuals -- either in Congress or

1 in the private sector -- have given recognition to the industry
2 for the massive refining effort within the last few months, and
3 I would like to personally take this opportunity to acknowledge
4 your splendid efforts.

5 On another -- and equally constructive -- note, the
6 Senate passed the necessary Right-of-Way bill for the Trans-
7 Alaska Pipeline and, unless something unforeseen takes place,
8 we can expect the House to act on the TAPS legislation within
9 the next week.

10 The disappearance of our spare productive capacity and
11 our increasing reliance on foreign sources of petroleum call
12 our attention to the need for measures to mitigate the effects
13 of sudden interruptions to petroleum supply. On December 5,
14 1972, my predecessor, Hollis Dole, requested the Council to
15 undertake a study of such a contingency and the remedies which
16 might be available. We appreciate the extreme complexity of
17 the problem as it was posed in our letter of request, and we
18 are grateful to the Council for the prompt and serious atten-
19 tion it has given to this important study. We shall wait the
20 results of your work with great interest, for the data that
21 you expose and the ideas that you generate are much needed for
22 an intelligent, constructive government policy and program for
23 handling potential interruptions to our foreign oil supply.

24 In another area of consideration some sectors of the
25 petroleum industry, especially the largest companies, are under

1 fire for anti-trust action from the staff of the Federal Trade
2 Commission, and at the state level in California, and in
3 Florida. I do not intend to speak directly to the substance
4 of any of these actions. However, I would like to give you
5 some personal observations in regard to attitudes, not only
6 in the Congress, but among the general public concerning the
7 petroleum industry.

8 I honestly believe that few Americans have a genuine
9 insight or understanding of anti-trust issues, other than
10 having a vague impression that there must be something sinister
11 about big business, and that New York City had more than its
12 share of World Series playoffs during the fifties and early
13 sixties.

14 There was a period in the early sixties, in fact, when
15 most sports section and editorial pages carried solemn appeals
16 to the Baseball Commissioner to "Break up the Yankees."

17 Although no such action occurred, front office problems,
18 as well as those in the field, have kept the Yankees out of the
19 World Series for years. However, in 1969, when the formerly
20 ignominious New York Mets swept Baltimore in four out of five
21 games, New York went wild again and predictably a number of
22 editorials dourly observed, "Let's break up the Mets!"

23 Few of the critical anti-trust issues are going to be
24 resolved overnight. However, many of the criticisms lodged
25 against industry and against government result from the fact

1 that a large number of people grasp at the most simplistic
2 solution. They must find a culprit. Industry, especially
3 the largest companies, are obvious candidates.

4 The fact remains, however, that the massive scale of our
5 energy base as well as the complex time and economic relation-
6 ships exclude simplistic answers. If there is a need for
7 blame, I am convinced there is enough to go around.

8 Our current energy posture, after all, didn't develop
9 overnight. For years, our domestic productive capacity has
10 been leveling off, while demand has soared. For years we
11 operated under government policies that today would be
12 inexcusable. For years we have allowed our domestic refinery
13 capacity to stagnate.

14 The root causes are far too involved to discuss in the
15 time available to me today, or in a single volume report, or
16 for that matter, in a ten minute speech on the floor of the
17 Congress. The symptoms of these causes, however, will con-
18 tinue to make good copy for investigative reports, and
19 excellent speech material.

20 I have no doubt that there are a few unquestioned
21 instances where individual companies have enjoyed increases in
22 first quarter profits by as much as 50 percent over previous
23 year's levels. These are individual cases typical of the un-
24 even performance of competitors in a private enterprise
25 economy where some companies do better than others. Yet, how

1 many people in government, or in the general public, are able
2 to look past the assertions of collusion and conspiracy to
3 create the energy crisis, when some Congressman bases his
4 charges on five isolated cases of what appears superficially
5 to be excessive profits?

6 How many members of the Congress are going to be willing
7 to continue to support needed energy legislation, when they
8 are unable to develop an insight into the massive capital and
9 technological problems facing the private sector?

10 An increasing number of members of the Congress, on both
11 sides of the House and the Senate, are evidencing constituent
12 concern for the relationship between the structure of the
13 petroleum industry and the availability and price of oil and
14 gasoline. Some of them have for years advocated a minimum of
15 government regulation in the private sector. Today, these
16 same men are asking their colleagues to look again at passing
17 increased responsibility for fuel supplies to the Federal
18 government, and still others are actively considering
19 divestiture.

20 We now have the provisions of Phase IV, which are so new
21 that it is premature for me to make any definitive statements
22 about them. In general, however, it would seem that the prob-
23 lems of refiners and marketers in accounting for and recovering
24 increased costs have been simplified by the new "roll-in"
25 provisions; that a positive incentive has been created for

1 investment in both exploration for and increased recovery
2 of domestic crude oil; and that the consumer will be protected
3 against unwarranted price increases. There is reason to
4 believe that a constructive balance has been struck between
5 the legitimate interests of both producers and consumers in
6 this important area of the nation's economy.

7 In my view, the remedy of last resort to alleviate our
8 energy problems would be to put the Department of Interior
9 in the gasoline marketing business. Nevertheless, everyone
10 in government, in Congress, and industry is going to be
11 increasingly faced with questions of this kind.

12 Consider just one example. Independent distributors and
13 marketers have depended for years on the wholesale spot market
14 and, in a sense, were created by the majors. Now, however,
15 since demand for petroleum products are pressing hard against
16 the capacity of domestic refiners, the integrated companies
17 are understandably reserving to their own outlets supplies
18 which in other circumstances would be available for independents.
19 Let's be frank -- the independent marketers account for 30
20 percent of the market, and they provide a major source of
21 competition within the industry. While your stockholders may
22 not appreciate it -- both prudence and good corporate citizen-
23 ship suggest strongly that some equitable plan for sharing the
24 hardships of the present situation is in order.

25 As an initial step, we have since May 10, been involved

1 in administering a voluntary petroleum allocation plan, which
2 is designed to put every marketer back in the same place he
3 occupied during the period between October 1, 1971, and
4 September 30, 1972, with adjustments for newcomers since that
5 time.

6 We have had something over two months experience with the
7 voluntary program, with mixed results. One of the major diffi-
8 culties we have encountered is inherent in the nature of the
9 program itself. A voluntary program, by definition, involves
10 a series of company decisions which are purely discretionary.
11 And these discretionary decisions are continually running into
12 limits that are circumscribed by contract or anti-trust law
13 which are not discretionary at all. The program thus appears
14 to be limited in its effectiveness by these two durable features
15 of existing law.

16 I should stress that any allocation program, whether
17 voluntary or mandatory in concept, is merely a palliative, not
18 a cure. It treats only the symptoms, not the disease. More-
19 over, such a measure can be effective only so long, after
20 which it begins to create more problems that it solves, for it
21 attempts to substitute the judgment of a bureaucracy for that
22 of the market place. The clear need is to get at the business
23 of treating the basic disorder which produced the distress we
24 are now feeling -- that is, to restore a proper balance
25 between demand and supply.

1 In addition to actions directly addressed to solving our
2 energy problems, there is a critical need in industry, in
3 government, and among consumers to develop an increased aware-
4 ness of the dimensions of our energy posture. This means
5 opening new avenues of communication, and establishing a
6 dialogue with every sector. The day is passing when any party
7 can point his finger accusingly at the environmentalists, at
8 big industry, or the Congress. I personally am gratified at
9 the magnificent support industry gave in our efforts to develop
10 consumer awareness to the need to conserve energy supplies.
11 That, however, is just a beginning. We must do more. The
12 National Petroleum Council, for example, has given this Depart-
13 ment and the Executive Branch invaluable assistance in develop-
14 ing innovative government policies that will help us meet our
15 national energy needs. In the meantime, however, it is all
16 too evident that many large corporations -- not just in the oil
17 industry but in others as well -- are quick to dismiss consumer
18 or congressional requests for a justification of company policy.
19 In my view this is not only poor business, it's an invitation
20 to more charges and accusations.

21 When the environmental movement first emerged, many
22 corporate leaders assumed that all of that irritating mail
23 could be shunted off to some obscure public office. More
24 often than not the company president who persisted in carrying
25 out this policy found himself in court with an even larger

1 "public affairs problem."

2 Well, the energy problem is not just a "public affairs
3 problem." It is an issue of prime importance nationally. In
4 my view, any corporate president or board of directors in the
5 petroleum industry who believes that its Washington office
6 alone can deal with National public opinion or Congressional
7 reaction, is in for a similar surprise.

8 Industry may have to accept modification and changes,
9 but the private sector will continue to represent our best
10 opportunity to provide the American consumer with stable,
11 clean energy supplies at a fair price. If industry is going
12 to continue to perform in that role, you must ensure that the
13 highest level of corporate management is striving to respond
14 not just to consumer demands for products -- but to the
15 consumer's need for understanding and insight into where our
16 energy industry is, what it is doing, and where it's going.

17 Thank you.

18 CHAIRMAN TRUE: Vincent Brown will now call the roll and
19 introduce new members. Rather than consume time with a name
20 by name roll call, we will take the record of names at the
21 door. However, I will ask Vince Brown to introduce the new
22 members who have been appointed since our last organizational
23 meeting last fall, and we are glad to have them present today.

24 REMARKS BY VINCENT BROWN

25 MR. BROWN: The appointment letters that go from

1 CHAIRMAN TRUE: And now for the purpose of presenting
2 a report of the Nominating Committee, I would like to introduce
3 Mr. Ernest B. Miller, Jr., Chairman.

4 REMARKS BY ERNEST B. MILLER, JR.

5 MR. MILLER: Mr. Chairman, the Nominating Committee,
6 consisting of Carroll M. Bennett, B. D. Goodrich, Charles E.
7 Spahr, and M. A. Wright, would like to nominate the following
8 for the positions of Chairman, Vice Chairman and Executive
9 Director: Chairman, H. A. True, Jr.; Vice Chairman, Robert G.
10 Dunlop; Executive Director, Vincent M. Brown. *not elected*
but appointed by Chairman

11 In addition, I would like to nominate the following to be
12 members of the Agenda Committee: Bob Burch, Maurice F.
13 Granville, Frank N. Ikard, John M. Kelly, H. M. McClure, Jr.,
14 D. A. McGee, John G. McLean, W. A. Strauss, Rawleigh Warner,
15 Jr., M. A. Wright, Chairman.

16 To be members of the Appointments Committee, I would like
17 to nominate the following: Perry R. Bass, W. T. Blackburn,
18 F. Allen Calvert, B. D. Goodrich, Fred L. Hartley, John R.
19 McMillan, Kenneth E. Montague, Charles H. Murphy, Jr.,
20 Wilton E. Scott, Robert V. Sellers, Chairman: Charles E. Spahr.

21 Mr. Chairman, I move the adoption of this report.

22 UNIDENTIFIED VOICE: I second

23 CHAIRMAN TRUE: Are there any additional nominations?
24 If not, those in favor of accepting the slate as proposed as
25 a whole, please say, "aye." (Ayes). Opposed? (No response)

1 The motion is adopted.

2 The Agenda Committee has also held a meeting and Mr. Jake
3 Hamon will present that report.

4 REMARKS BY JAKE L. HAMON

5 MR. HAMON: Pursuant to a call for a meeting of the
6 Agenda Committee by the Chairman and with the approval of
7 Honorable Stephen A. Wakefield, Government Co-Chairman of
8 the Committee, a meeting was held on July 16 to consider a
9 study request letter from the U. S. Department of the Interior.

10 (1) Action was taken on a letter dated July 23, 1973,
11 from Secretary of the Interior Rogers C. B. Morton to H. A.
12 True, Jr. The letter reads as follows:

13 "Dear Mr. True:

14 "In his energy statement of June 29, the President
15 announced additional steps being taken to conserve
16 America's fuel supplies and their use, and called
17 upon private industry to respond to the energy con-
18 servation directives with all the imagination and
19 resourcefulness that has made this National the
20 richest on earth.

21 "In December 1972, the National Petroleum Council
22 submitted to me a comprehensive summary report on
23 "U.S. Energy Outlook," the supporting detailed
24 task force reports now being received for each fuel
25 as completed. The results of this exhaustive work

1 done by the energy industries has been of major
2 value to the Department and other agencies of Govern-
3 ment, shedding considerable light on the U. S. fuel
4 supply situation in particular.

5 "In order to further assist us in assessing the
6 patterns of future U. S. energy use, the National
7 Petroleum Council is requested to conduct a study
8 which would analyze and report on the possibilities
9 for energy conservation in the United States and
10 the impact of such measures on the future energy
11 posture of the Nation.

12 "You are requested to submit a progress report by
13 January 1, 1974.

14 "Sincerely yours,

15 /s/ Rogers C. B. Morton

16 "Secretary of the Interior"

17 The Agenda Committee recommends that the analysis be
18 undertaken and it was unanimously agreed to recommend to NPC
19 members the appointment of a committee to undertake the study
20 requested by Secretary Morton.

21 (2) At this same session, the Agenda Committee con-
22 sidered an additional request letter from Assistant Secretary
23 of the Interior for Energy and Minerals Stephen A. Wakefield.
24 It reads as follows:

25 "Dear Mr. True:

1 to prepare a new report on available petroleum
2 inventories and storage capacity. This new report
3 should emphasize the distinction between available
4 stocks and those unavailable, and it should also
5 provide, to the fullest extent possible, coverage on
6 plans for new storage construction. Its findings
7 will be a useful complement to the Council's investiga-
8 tion of emergency preparedness for interruption of
9 petroleum imports. It would be appreciated if these
10 findings could be completed for submission to the
11 Department of the Interior by February 1974.

12 "Sincerely yours,

13 /s/ Stephen A. Wakefield

14 Assistant Secretary of the Interior"

15 Again, the Committee recommends that this analysis be
16 undertaken and that a committee be formed to comply with the
17 request.

18 In complying with these requests the committees under-
19 taking the studies should not suggest plans or programs.

20 I move the adoption of this report.

21 CHAIRMAN TRUE: All those in favor, say "Aye." (Ayes)

22 Opposed. (No response). The motion is adopted.

23 As you know, the Committee on Factors Affecting U. S.
24 Petroleum Refining issued a summary report at the last Council
25 meeting. To present a short progress report on the additional

1 work being done by the Committee, I would like to present
2 Vince Brown, the Secretary of that Committee.

3 REMARKS BY VINCENT BROWN

4 MR. BROWN: Mr. Chairman, Mr. Secretary and fellow
5 members of the National Petroleum Council:

6 This morning, I would like to report to you the progress
7 on the refining study which had been made since our last
8 meeting in May. At that time, you approved the Summary Report
9 which has been released in final form and has received sub-
10 stantial distribution.

11 As you will recall, the committee organization included
12 task groups on economics, facilities and technology, and
13 government policies which provided the analysis and data from
14 which the Summary Report was prepared. Since May, these task
15 groups have been documenting the methodology, data and
16 illustrations of their analysis. This work is being currently
17 combined into a comprehensive and cohesive document which the
18 Committee on Factors Affecting U. S. Petroleum Refining hopes
19 to approve for publication in the very near future. In addi-
20 tion, part of the Committee assignment was to update the
21 refining portion of the 1967 NPC report, Impact of New
22 Technology on the U. S. Petroleum Industry (1946-1965). A
23 comprehensive and thorough evaluation of the current state of
24 technology in the refining segment of our business has been
25 completed and is currently being approved by the Committee

1 for publication at a very early date. I think the publication
2 of this document will be a substantial addition to the litera-
3 ture on the subject.

4 That, Mr. Chairman, completes my follow-up report. I
5 would again like to express my appreciation to all those who
6 are involved in the study for their time and effort.

7 Thank you.

8 CHAIRMAN TRUE: The Committee on Emergency Preparedness
9 has been working for the past several months to provide an
10 assessment of the U. S. capabilities to respond to a sudden
11 but temporary denial of petroleum imports. Although more
12 time will be required to complete the study, the Committee on
13 Emergency Preparedness has compiled an interim report.
14 Carroll Bennett, Chairman of the Committee will present the
15 report.

16 REMARKS BY CARROLL BENNETT

17 MR. BENNETT: Mr. Chairman, Mr. Secretary and fellow
18 members of the National Petroleum Council:

19 In early 1973, the National Petroleum Council was re-
20 quested by the Department of the Interior to make a compre-
21 hensive study and analysis of possible emergency supplements
22 to or alternatives for imported oil, natural gas liquids and
23 petroleum products in the event of an interruption of these
24 imports into the United States. At the outset it was recognized
25 that completion of this study would require about one year;

1 however, the Secretary requested that the NPC present an
2 Interim Report of its findings in July 1973. Copies of the
3 proposed Interim Report were mailed to you last week.

4 The objective of this study is to assess the capabilities
5 of the United States to cope with a sudden by temporary
6 interruption of petroleum imports into this country and to
7 review the options open to us to minimize the impact of such
8 an interruption. It should be carefully noted that this is
9 fundamentally a different condition from the current tight
10 petroleum supply situation which exists domestically. Tight
11 supply in this country results from trends which have been
12 established over a period of years, and it is expected that
13 these trends will persist during the next several years. This
14 Committee, on the other hand, concerns itself with a sudden
15 interruption of imports which is of limited duration.

16 The solutions available to minimize the impact of a
17 short-term imports interruption are fundamentally different
18 from those required to correct the long-term domestic supply
19 situation. In the event of a short-term interruption of the
20 magnitude specified by the Secretary of the Interior, it
21 would be extremely difficult for the economy to readjust
22 itself without resorting to emergency measures. Measures
23 which are applicable for short periods of time include sub-
24 stantial reductions in demand, emergency production measures
25 and reliance on crude and products which have been stockpiled

1 and maximum utilization of available alternate energy sources.
2 Obviously, these emergency measures can only be maintained for
3 weeks or months rather than years.

4 In response to the Secretary's request, the Council has
5 been fortunate in having the active participation of some 20
6 council members on the Committee. The Committee has been able
7 cochaired by the Honorable Stephen A. Wakefield, Assistant
8 Secretary of the Interior for Energy and Minerals, and assisted
9 by a Coordinating Subcommittee, chaired by Dr. James S. Cross,
10 Director, Economics and Industry Affairs, Sun Oil Company,
11 and cochaired by Duke R. Ligon, Director, U. S. Office of Oil
12 and Gas, Department of the Interior.

13 The purpose of the Interim Report is to present the pre-
14 liminary findings of the Committee. Although the Committee's
15 study and final report will not be completed for several months,
16 it is believed that these preliminary findings will aid both
17 industry and government in their initial efforts to formulate
18 emergency preparedness plans. Again, it should be emphasized
19 that these are preliminary findings and that additional and
20 more detailed results will be presented in the final report.
21 The preliminary findings and conclusions of the Interim Report
22 are shown on this slide. (Slide 1 on.)

23 First, emergency measures for interruption of petroleum
24 imports are not applicable to the Nation's tight supply
25 problems.

1 Secondly, the best way to minimize the impact of an
2 imports interruption is to develop domestic energy resources
3 to the maximum possible extent.

4 Thirdly, virtually no spare or marginal petroleum produc-
5 ing capacity exists in the United States today and creating
6 such a margin solely for emergency preparedness is not an
7 efficient use of resources.

8 Additionally, compliance with voluntary curtailment
9 measures will be low. Mandatory measures, while more effective
10 by definition, must be implemented with full cognizance of
11 their downstream or secondary effects upon the domestic
12 economy.

13 And finally, less wasteful and more efficient use of
14 energy is the most cost efficient means of reducing demand.
15 (Slide 1 off.)

16 Areas of study for which significant findings can be
17 reported include evaluations of savings through petroleum use
18 curtailment which might be realized through voluntary or
19 mandatory measures, estimates of emergency oil production
20 volumes, and evaluations of the feasibility and cost of pro-
21 viding emergency standby petroleum supplies by storage or by
22 restriction of domestic production. Jim Cross will review the
23 specific progress of his Subcommittee shortly.

24 A review of existing emergency preparedness programs is
25 one of the areas of study not yet complete. A preliminary

1 analysis indicates that a number of administrative and legal
2 considerations are important to the development of emergency
3 preparedness plans.

4 Increasing dependence on imported petroleum has created
5 a new potential emergency situation. This new situation must
6 be defined so that the need for emergency action can be
7 determined and procedures developed for activating an emergency
8 preparedness plan. The basic administrative machinery for
9 emergency preparedness planning exists at the federal level.
10 However, most of the existing plans relate to war conditions.

11 Specific actions which are needed are shown on the next
12 slide: (Slide 2 on.)

13 ° A critical review of the objectives, authority and
14 organization of the existing emergency preparedness
15 machinery in the light of an import interruption.

16 ° A review and reconciliation of the potential conflicts
17 between federal and state authority in the areas of
18 resource conservation and regulation, and

19 ° Initiation of cooperative planning efforts by govern-
20 ment and industry.

21 To minimize the impact of an emergency interruption, it
22 will be necessary to develop emergency preparedness plans which
23 provide for reducing demand and increasing domestic supplies.

24 (Slide 2 off, Slide 3 on.)

25 Ultimately, the best way to minimize the impact of an

1 imports interruption is to develop domestic energy resources
2 to the maximum possible extent. It is important to recognize
3 that the United States has vast energy resources which can be
4 developed given the proper economic and regulatory climate.
5 Their development will, however, require very large capital
6 expenditures and lead times of 5 to 10 years before any sub-
7 stantial results can be realized. Because of these long lead
8 times, it is imperative that positive steps be taken now to
9 ensure the future availability of these reserves.

10 Unless greater priority is placed upon domestic energy
11 development, the result will be continued delays which will
12 contribute substantially to domestic supply shortages and will
13 increase the Nation's vulnerability to imports interruption.

14 In preparing emergency preparedness plans, the Committee
15 concludes that the following additional items must be con-
16 sidered:

17 First, that alternative methods of reducing demand must
18 take into account the ultimate impact on the consumer and the
19 economy. Moreover, regional differences must be considered.

20 Secondly, recognition must be given to the fact that con-
21 version from petroleum usage to coal may involve conflict with
22 existing legislation, particularly that which deals with local
23 ambient air quality standards.

24 Thirdly, the Committee feels that emergency increases in
25 production will require the establishment, in advance of

1 interruption, of the rate and duration over which production,
2 in excess of legally established maximum efficient rate, can
3 be sustained. State and local regulatory agencies must be
4 consulted and producer equities must be considered in any
5 such plans.

6 Additionally, storage programs should be developed as
7 part of an emergency preparedness plan. Local requirements
8 may dictate differing regional storage needs.

9 The Committee feels strongly that whatever emergency
10 preparedness plan is developed should have the objective of
11 returning -- as soon as possible -- to a free market environ-
12 ment where economic incentives are adequate to encourage
13 additional finding and development activities and reduce
14 consumption.

15 And finally, the Committee concludes that restriction
16 of production by either shutting in fields or proration is
17 not an economically feasible emergency preparedness alternative.
18 Oil and gas from these sources would reduce U. S. dependence
19 on imports or would make additional supplies available for
20 storage.) (Slide 3 off.)

21 I would now like to call on Jim Cross, Chairman of the
22 Coordinating Subcommittee, to report to you on the progress
23 of his Subcommittees.

24 REMARKS BY JAMES S. CROSS

25 DR. CROSS: Thank you, Carrol. To implement the study

1 requested by the Secretary of the Interior, the Committee on
2 Emergency Preparedness organized a Coordinating Subcommittee
3 to direct the work of Subcommittees on Emergency Petroleum
4 Production, Fuel Convertibility and Energy Use Curtailment,
5 and Logistics.

6 To respond adequately to the Secretary's request, the
7 Committee concluded that it would be necessary to analyze
8 the impact of an emergency under two basic conditions. The
9 first condition is one in which the United States has only
10 minimal opportunity to develop emergency preparedness plans
11 and take positive steps, such as establishing emergency
12 petroleum supplies to minimize the impact of an imports
13 interruption. This condition is postulated by an interruption
14 occurring on January 1, 1974, when it will be necessary to
15 rely almost completely on existing administrative systems and
16 physical facilities. The second condition is one in which
17 the Nation has sufficient time to develop emergency plans and
18 take positive steps to offset an interruption. A date of
19 January 1, 1978, was selected as the earliest time by which
20 significant protective measures could be placed in effect.

21 The next slide (Slide 4 on) shows the import disruption
22 cases we are considering. The first case is a near-term,
23 limited disruption of 1.5 million barrels of oil per day for
24 90 days. The second is also near-term, but of greater
25 severity and length -- 3 million barrels per day for 180 days.

1 The third case is representative of a significant import
2 disruption occurring in the more distant future. As noted
3 on the slide, each of these primary cases is being considered
4 under conditions where the interrupted supply is all crude oil
5 and where it is 60 percent crude and 40 percent refined
6 products.

7 The next slide (Slide 5 on) shows a summary of the
8 potential reductions in oil demand which could be available
9 through use curtailment measures.

10 On an emergency basis, petroleum fuel usage could
11 possibly be reduced in the range of about 1.2 million barrels
12 per day to 1.6 million barrels per day in 1974 and 1.4 million
13 barrels per day to 2.0 million barrels per day in 1978, with
14 a combination of voluntary and mandatory fuel curtailment
15 procedures. Rapid attainment of these reductions would depend
16 on the ready availability of a standby gasoline rationing
17 system that could be put into effect quickly.

18 The underlying analyses assume reductions from normal
19 base demand levels. However, in view of the current tight
20 supply situation, it is possible that the curtailment
21 measures considered will have already been applied to some
22 degree. If base demands are lower prior to the emergency,
23 then reduction in oil demand would be correspondingly less
24 than indicated. Voluntary items considered would require
25 widespread public acceptance of the need for such actions

1 and mandatory programs would require extensive pre-planning.

2 Voluntary gasoline curtailment items include increased
3 car pooling, rescheduling truck deliveries to off-peak traffic
4 hours and reduced recreational uses. With full public compli-
5 ance, this approach could potentially decrease fuel consumption
6 by 0.9 million barrels per day in 1974 and 1.1 million barrels
7 per day in 1978. However, based on World War II voluntary
8 curtailment experience, it is estimated that only 10 to 20
9 percent of the assessed potential reduction would be realized.
10 Clearly, support for voluntary curtailment would require a
11 massive public information program, widespread public convic-
12 tion of the existence of a shortage, understanding of various
13 gasoline conservation measures and willingness to apply them.

14 Other measures envisioned in the reductions shown in the
15 slide include reductions in jet fuel demand through increases
16 in aircraft load factors and operating altitudes and decreases
17 in operating airspeeds; reduction in diesel fuel demand by
18 reducing speed limits for trucks and buses; and reducing
19 utility fuel requirements by less residential heating, cooling
20 and lighting.

21 Important considerations in assessing energy-use curtail-
22 ments in an emergency include (1) impact on the domestic
23 economy, (2) effects on public welfare, and (3) time required
24 for implementation. Analysis of the economic impact of
25 curtailments considered here has not yet been completed.

1 However, most of the measures noted should not be excessively
2 burdensome to the economy or to public welfare, and can be
3 quickly implemented.

4 "Fuel Convertibility" refers to the ability of an energy
5 using activity to shift from one form of energy input to
6 another. The Committee is now attempting to determine the
7 extent to which the effects of an oil import denial might be
8 offset by such fuel conversions. Possibilities include the
9 conversion of oil consuming facilities to use of coal and/or
10 natural gas; other possibilities include increased use of
11 electricity not derived from oil or gas.

12 Convertibility of utility boilers from oil and gas to
13 coal is being investigated with the aid of a survey recently
14 completed by the Federal Power Commission. Until these data
15 are analyzed, only very tentative estimates can be made. It
16 now appears that only about 250 thousand barrels per day could
17 be saved by converting to coal in a short-term emergency.
18 This relatively low figure results in large part from the
19 fact that much of the former coal-burning and coal-handling
20 facilities have been dismantled. It is also partially
21 attributable to existing bottlenecks and deteriorations in
22 the coal logistical system, as well as to mining limitations
23 and the incompatibility of certain boilers and certain coals.
24 These factors will be quantified as fully as possible in the
25 final report.

1 There are two means of providing incremental petroleum
2 production in an emergency:

- 3 1. Production of existing reserves at rates in
4 excess of their legally established maximum efficient rates;
5 2. Production of the now shut-in naval petroleum
6 reserves.

7 The emergency production volume from these potential
8 sources are summarized on the next slide.

9 (Slide 6 on.)

10 These additional production levels require gas flaring
11 and cannot be sustained for any significant period beyond 180
12 days due to the natural behavior of the reservoirs.

13 Additionally, these volumes are based on the following
14 assumptions:

- 15 1. Temporary emergency production above legally estab-
16 lished maximum efficient rates would be allowed.
17 2. Emergency preparedness plans which define allowable
18 rates of emergency production would be developed by the
19 affected states prior to an emergency.
20 3. Requisite field facilities modifications and expendi-
21 tures are made.
22 4. Action is taken by the Federal Government to permit
23 the production of petroleum reserves underlying the Naval
24 Petroleum Reserve No. 1 located at Elk Hills, California,
25 which would require a joint resolution of Congress.

1 The potential volumes of emergency petroleum production
2 shown for 1978 depend on planning and investments made prior
3 to the emergency. The slide also summarizes the volumes and
4 investments involved.

5 (Slide 6 off.)

6 The final area of study in which significant progress can
7 be reported is that of storage alternatives. Given adequate
8 planning and lead time, there are two basic methods which can
9 be used:

- 10 1. Direct storage of petroleum.
- 11 2. Restricting domestic production until needed in an
12 emergency.

13 Alternatives for storage of emergency petroleum supplies
14 include:

- 15 1. Aboveground storage in steel tanks, or
- 16 2. Underground storage in salt domes, mined caverns or
17 abandoned mines. Alternatives for the restriction of produc-
18 tion consist of:

- 19 1. Nationwide prorationing, or
- 20 2. Shutting in selected fields.

21 Any emergency standby petroleum supply system must meet
22 two requirements: First, it must include sufficient volume of
23 crude oil or products to satisfy the need; and second, it must
24 have the capacity to deliver this crude or product at the
25 required daily rate. For example, if protection against

1 3 million barrels per day interruption for 180 days is required,
2 540 million barrels of crude oil or product is needed, and more
3 important, capacity must be provided to deliver the crude or
4 product at a rate of 3 million barrels per day.

5 The alternatives which involve maintaining reserves in the
6 ground by restricting production have the disadvantage of re-
7 quiring a large total volume of reserves to provide a desired
8 daily producing capacity. This results from the basic mechanism
9 of fluid flow in petroleum reservoirs. Assuming an R/P of eight,
10 protection against a 6-month, 3 million barrels per day interrup-
11 tion would require 8.8 billion barrels of shut-in reserves.
12 Although some field can and do produce at lower R/P's, it is
13 doubtful if enough of these type reserves exist to provide an
14 appreciable amount of shut-in protection.

15 On the other hand, storage requires producing and transfer-
16 ring only the needed volume of oil into storage where it can
17 be delivered at very high rates when an emergency occurs. For
18 example, in comparison to the 8.8 billion barrels requirement
19 mentioned for shut-in reserves, only 540 million barrels is
20 required to provide protection against the 6-month, 3 million
21 barrels per day interruption.

22 Based on the results of this study, the storage of large
23 volumes of crude and/or products in leached salt dome cavities
24 is the least expensive storage alternative, and the technology
25 has been developed and is applied extensively. Aboveground

1 storage in steel tanks may be preferable for specific condi-
2 tions, and while more expensive than salt dome storage, it is
3 considerably less costly than the shut-in alternative.

4 That completes my progress report, Carroll, and I
5 appreciate this opportunity to report on the progress of the
6 Coordinating Subcommittee.

7 MR. BENNETT: Thank you, Jim -- your groups have indeed
8 made a great deal of progress.

9 I would like to remind the members of the Council that
10 much work remains to be completed and that our final report is
11 not expected to be ready for several months.

12 Mr. Chairman, that completes ^{my} presentation, and I should
13 now like to move for approval of this Interim Report of the
14 Committee on Emergency Preparedness by the membership of the
15 National Petroleum Council.

16 MR. HAMON: I second.

17 CHAIRMAN TRUE: Is there any discussion?

18 (No response).

19 CHAIRMAN TRUE: I will hear the ayes.

20 (Ayes.)

21 CHAIRMAN TRUE: Any opposed?

22 (No response.)

23 CHAIRMAN TRUE: Thank you very much. Thank you Carroll
24 and Jim for your remarks. I know that the Committee will con-
25 tinue to provide valuable information as it moves toward the

1 completion of its work. Gentlemen, we were all saddened by the
2 untimely death of our colleague, George F. Getty. Ernest B.
3 Miller will present a Memorial Resolution to him.

1 MEMORIAL RESOLUTION TO GEORGE F. GETTY

5 BY ERNEST B. MILLER, JR.

6 MR. MILLER: The members of the National Petroleum Council
7 note with deep regret the passing on June 6, 1973, of their
8 distinguished colleague, George F. Getty II.

9 Having entered the oil industry as an independent operator
10 in 1947, his interests and activities during his years in the
11 industry spanned the globe.

12 The depth of his leadership may best be illustrated by
13 the activities he undertook in business and civic affairs.
14 A valued member of the Council for 11 years, George Getty also
15 served the industry as a director of the American Petroleum
16 Institute, and of Getty Oil Company. A reserved man in his
17 business dealings, his efforts on numerous National Petroleum
18 Council committees earned our respect and gratitude.

19 Today the members of the National Petroleum Council pay
20 tribute to the memory of George F. Getty II, a true leader of
21 the industry. We extend our profound sympathy to his wife and
22 children. His advice and leadership will be missed.

23 Now, therefore, be it resolved on the 24th day of July
24 1973, the city of Washington, D. C., that this resolution be
25 entered upon the permanent records of the Council and an

1 appropriate copy thereof be delivered to the family of George
2 F. Getty II as a remembrance of the affection and respect which
3 we shall always have for him.

4 I recommend the adoption.

5 CHAIRMAN TRUE: I recommend we unanimously accept and
6 adopt this Resolution and stand for a moment of silence.

7 (Moment of silence).

8 CHAIRMAN TRUE: Thank you, Ernie. I know we all feel a
9 sense of loss at his passing. Now, under other matters,
10 Co-Chairman Stephen B. Wakefield had a letter of business
11 which not all of the NPC members will find close to their
12 hearts.

13 MR. WAKEFIELD: I think since the inception of the
14 National Petroleum Council in 1947, that Wylie Whishonant has
15 never missed a meeting and even though he had retired, he still
16 returns for the Council meetings. It is, therefore, the
17 appropriate forum, therefore, for the presentation of this
18 recognition of his exceptional service to the Department of
19 the Interior.

20 **CITATION FOR MERITORIOUS SERVICE - WYLIE WHISHONANT**

21 "In recognition of the exceptionally dedicated service
22 to the Department of the Interior.

23 "Mr. Whishonant began his government career with the
24 Department of the Interior in 1935. He entered the
25 Government service as an Assistant Messenger and rose

1 to the position of Assistant Administrative Officer
2 (Property Management and Office Services) in the
3 Office of Oil and Gas.

4 "Mr. Whishonant has made many outstanding contributions
5 in the administrative field during his career.

6 "He always displayed unusual resourcefulness, initiative,
7 competence and tact in carrying out assignments. One
8 of his major accomplishments was the assistance,
9 cooperation and service rendered during serious
10 emergencies in World War II with the Petroleum Adminis-
11 tration for War, the Korean War with the Petroleum
12 Administration for Defense, and numerous Middle East
13 oil emergencies.

14 "The kindness and spirit of helpfulness that
15 Mr. Whishonant exhibited in government-industry work-
16 ing relationships won him the respect and affection of
17 all concerned. In recognition of his wholehearted
18 dedication to his career as a public servant and
19 the outstanding example he set for his fellow employees,
20 through his government service, Mr. Wyle H. Whishonant
21 is granted the Meritorious Service Award of the
22 Department of the Interior."

23 Signed, Rogers C. B. Morton, Secretary of the Interior"

24 MR. WAKEFIELD: We have for Wylie, in addition to the
25 letter from Secretary Morton which I just read, an Honorable

1 Award Certificate, a tie tack and a medallion of the Department
2 for meritorious service.

3 MR. WHISHONANT: Mr. Secretary, members of government,
4 members of the industry, this is one of the most delightful
5 moments of my life. If it had not been for your cooperation
6 and Divine Guidance, I never could have come to this point
7 in life. However, there are many of you that have been help-
8 ful to me, and I will assure you as long as life shall last, if
9 there is anything I can do along life's highway for you, call
10 on me. There is one individual in here that has been most
11 helpful to me during all of my career, and I would like,
12 Mr. Chairman, if it is permissible to have this individual
13 stand. I would like Mr. Bruce K. Brown to stand.

14 He has been a wonderful help to me. He has been like a
15 father to me. He taught me how to write with both hands at
16 the same time.

17 There is only one thing I would like to ask of the
18 Council, that they would permit me to get a miniature rig,
19 drilling rig, or a miniature boat to carry oil, so that I can
20 become an honorary member of the Council.

21 (Applause)

22 CHAIRMAN TRUE: Thank you, Steve, and thank you and
23 congratulations to you, Wylie.

24 Are there any other matters to be brought before the
25 Council?

1 I would like to announce that a short press conference
2 will be held in this auditorium immediately following the
3 meeting. For this reason, we would appreciate it if the
4 room would be cleared as quickly as possible.

5 If there is no further business, the meeting stands
6 adjourned.

7 (Meeting Adjourned).
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END